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Abstract
Using consolidated firm-level accounting data for about 3,400 companies in 15
OECD countries from ORBIS (2003–2007), this paper compares the tax burden of
companies headquartered in worldwide countries with that of companies headquar-
tered in territorial countries. The tax burden is measured by a marginal effective tax
rate (METR) and, employing a new methodology, by a marginal effective tax base
(METB) which controls for statutory corporate tax rates. A higher METR for entities
headquartered in worldwide jurisdictions is explained by higher corporate statutory
tax rates rather than by the difference in the taxation of foreign profits. The METB
of companies headquartered in worldwide countries is not statistically different from
that of companies headquartered in territorial countries. Using corporate presence in
tax havens, the paper also investigates the vulnerability of territorial jurisdictions to
tax avoidance. The results show that offshore low-tax operations reduce the METR
and the METB of multinationals more in territorial systems than in worldwide systems.
Keywords: Corporation Income Tax; Multinationals; Territoriality; Worldwide Principle;
Profit Shifting; Tax Avoidance; Tax Havens
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1 Introduction
Since Japan and the United Kingdom adopted a territorial system in 2009, the United States
remains the only major country with a worldwide taxation system for corporate income.
Under a territorial system which exempts foreign profits, companies have an incentive to
maximise overall group profit by locating their real activities, and by shifting some of their
earnings, into low-tax jurisdictions. Under a worldwide system of taxation, this incentive is
smaller as foreign profits are taxed at the same rate as domestic profits when and if they are
repatriated. This could imply a higher tax burden for companies headquartered in worldwide
countries. In US academic and policy circles, the advantages and disadvantages of a world-
wide system (versus a territorial one) are at the centre of a lively debate on fundamental tax
reforms of the US tax system (Shaviro [2011]). For example, in September 2011, Avi-Yonah
[2011] and Hines [2011] testified before the US Senate Finance committee on tax reform
options, respectively suggesting a reduction in the statutory corporate tax rate (together
with the abolition of deferral) and the adoption of the territorial system. At the heart of
this discussion lies the concern that the current tax system hampers the competitiveness of
US multinationals (Dyreng and Lindsey [2009] and Markle and Shackelford [2011]).
Using a firm-level panel for 15 OECD countries, this paper systematically compares the tax
burden of corporate groups headquartered in worldwide countries with that of groups head-
quartered in territorial countries. Tax burdens are measured in two ways. First, the paper
estimates a marginal effective tax rate (METR) which measures the increase in group tax
liabilities when accounting profits increase by one US dollar. Second, using a new approach,
the paper estimates a marginal effective tax base (METB) which measures the increase in
the tax base for an additional dollar of accounting profit. The METB is able to isolate the
effect of national corporate statutory rates on tax burdens and it allows an assessment of
whether a higher tax burden is the result of a high statutory rate or of a large tax base. The
distinction is fundamental when comparing the worldwide and the territorial systems. This
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paper also investigates whether the territorial system is more vulnerable to tax avoidance
through the use of tax havens. It tests whether tax haven operations lower the tax burden
more in a corporate group headquartered in a territorial jurisdiction than in a corporation
headquartered in a country adopting a worldwide system.
This is the first paper to introduce and estimate the METB which assesses firms effective
tax burdens in isolation from statutory corporate tax rates. The use of the METB allows to
identify that a higher tax burden in worldwide jurisdictions such as the UK and the US is
due to high corporate statutory tax rates and not to the system of taxation of foreign prof-
its. A further original contribution of the paper is that it compares estimated METRs and
METBs across different jurisdictions whilst considering and dealing with crucial statistical
issues such as endogeneity. Finally, the analysis relies on a new dataset constructed by merg-
ing two cross-countries firm-level databases, ORBIS and ZEPHYR, respectively containing
financial information and ownership changes. This is the first dataset used for the compar-
ison of tax burdens across jurisdictions which both spans cross-country and also contains
a time-varying indicator of corporate groups’ presence in tax havens. The structure of the
dataset permits the comparison of the effect of tax haven operations across different home
countries whilst controlling for endogeneity.
The results show that corporate groups whose ultimate owner is resident in jurisdictions
applying the worldwide principle are characterized by a higher METR. In particular, com-
panies headquartered in the United States display the highest METR (between 33.7 and 36.7
per cent) and companies headquartered in the United Kingdom1 the second highest METR
(between 28.6 and 29.8 per cent). On average corporate groups headquartered in territorial
jurisdictions feature a much lower METR of between 16.5 and 21.9 per cent. However, when
controlling for the statutory national corporate tax rates, and therefore comparing METBs,
1UK data in the sample used here precede the reform by which the UK has adopted the territoriality
principle in 2009.
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the difference between worldwide and territorial jurisdictions is not statistically significant.
Depending on the specification, an additional dollar of accounting profit increases the tax
base by between 80 and 84 cents. This holds for all firms, irrespective of where they are res-
ident. This indicates that a higher burden is mainly the consequence of high statutory rates
in the home country, rather than the consequence of the difference in how foreign profits are
taxed.
The analysis produces further evidence consistent with tax haven subsidiaries lowering the
tax burden (measured by both the METR and the METB) more in territorial jurisdictions.
With low-tax operations, international companies resident in territorial countries are able
to reduce their METR and their METB more than corporate groups resident in worldwide
countries.
The study is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the literature. Section 3 presents the
data used in the empirical section. Section 4 develops the empirical model and discusses
various econometric issues. Section 5 presents the results. Section 6 concludes.
2 Literature
Despite a lively debate in the policy arena, there is very little empirical evidence on the
difference in tax burdens between groups headquartered in worldwide countries and groups
headquartered in territorial countries. Only two contributions relate directly to the work
presented here: Dyreng and Lindsey [2009], who examine US-headquartered multinationals,
and Markle and Shackelford [2011], who investigate firms headquartered in different coun-
tries.2
2A much wider literature investigates firm-level tax payments and corporate avoidance activities. Such
literature mainly concentrates on profit-shifting to low-tax jurisdictions through manipulation of transfer-
prices and (or) debt financing. For contributions that report findings of direct evidence of transfer-pricing
activities among US multinationals, see Swenson [2001]; Clausing [2003]; Bernard et al. [2006]. Altshuler
and Grubert [2002] and Desai et al. [2004], among others, find direct evidence of debt shifting with US data.
Huizinga et al. [2008] report evidence of debt shifting using European data from AMADEUS. Maffini and
Mokkas [2011] find evidence of transfer-pricing activities using a similar dataset. Several researchers find
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Dyreng and Lindsey [2009] estimate the worldwide, federal, and foreign METR on the cor-
responding worldwide, domestic, and foreign incomes of US-headquartered multinationals.
They use a panel of consolidated US accounting data from Compustat for the period 1995 to
2007. The time-varying presence of a corporate group in low-tax jurisdictions is derived from
Exhibit 21 of form 10-K submitted to the US Security and Exchange Commission. Using
an OLS estimator, the authors find that the worldwide METR (inclusive of US state taxes)
for US multinationals is about 36 per cent. Despite using different data (Compustat versus
ORBIS), different time periods, and different estimators (OLS versus a Generalised Method
of Moments), the estimated worldwide METR in Dyreng and Lindsey [2009] is very close
to the findings in this paper for US multinationals (without tax haven operations). Both
papers employ consolidated accounting data and estimate the METR.
Dyreng and Lindsey [2009] focus primarily on the effect of tax haven operations. They find
that the effect of tax haven operations on the worldwide tax charges of US multinationals
is small: for groups with at least one subsidiary in a low-tax jurisdiction, the METR is one
and a half percentage points lower than the METR of other MNCs.
Markle and Shackelford [2011] compute average effective tax rates (AETRs) between 1988
and 2007 for companies headquartered in 85 countries. They employ consolidated account-
ing data from OSIRIS3 which contains ownership information, including the location of the
headquarters and the presence of tax haven subsidiaries. Given the time-invariant nature
of the ownership information, the research employs a pooled OLS. Markle and Shackelford
[2011] calculate the AETR as the ratio of book total tax expenses divided by net income
before taxes (NIBT). They employ only companies with positive NIBT and positive tax
charges. The selection of only profitable companies can bias the estimations towards finding
direct evidence of debt shifting using the German Bundesbank MiDi dataset (see Mintz and Weichenrieder
[2005]; Buettner et al. [2006]; Buettner and Wamser [2009]).
3OSIRIS is produced by Bureau van Dijk, as ORBIS. It contains financial information for listed companies,
listed banks, and listed insurance companies around the world.
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a negative effect of tax haven subsidiaries on tax liabilities as profitable firms have a greater
incentive to locate part of their operations in offshore low-tax jurisdictions whilst non prof-
itable firms have a lower incentive to hold tax haven subsidiaries. Regressing the AETR on a
set of country dummies identifying the location of the ultimate owner and of its subsidiaries,
Markle and Shackelford [2011] investigate whether companies headquartered in worldwide
countries have a higher AETR than companies headquartered in territorial countries. They
find a counterintuitive result: on average, firms resident in a worldwide jurisdiction face a
lower AETR (-1.4 per cent). The authors also find that on average the AETR of corporate
groups with tax haven affiliates is 0.5 percentage points lower than the AETR of the ultimate
owners without low-tax offshore operations.4
The presence in tax havens could be proxying some other characteristics such as the observ-
able size and profitability of the company or the unobserved ability of the tax department to
reduce the fiscal burden of the group effectively. If the observed and unobserved character-
istics of the firm are not controlled for, one would attribute a lower tax bill to the presence
in tax havens when in fact, the ability of the tax department determines both the tax bill
and the decision to locate some operations offshore. Also, the presence in tax havens could
be determined at the same time as the tax burden. In this context one has to control for the
heterogeneity of observable characteristics such as profitability, intangibles intensity, and size
and for unobservable characteristics such as the aggressiveness of the tax department. To
this aim, this paper employs a time-varying ownership structure together with a difference
generalised method of moments (GMM-diff). This controls for the unobservable group-level
fixed effects and for unobservable shocks which affect both the dependent and the indepen-
dent variables.
As in Markle and Shackelford [2011], this paper finds that the domicile is very important in
4The only exception is Japan.
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determining the tax burden of a company. In particular, US companies display a very high
tax burden in both studies and very close to the estimates in Dyreng and Lindsey [2009].
The analysis presented here qualifies and extends these results finding that a high burden is
likely to be the consequence of a high statutory tax rate and not of the system of taxation
of profits (worldwide versus territorial).
The results imply also that in worldwide systems, lower tax rates on foreign income are
compensated by higher national tax rates on the same foreign income. This is consistent
with Dyreng and Lindsey [2009] who find that for US multinationals, locating material oper-
ations in certain low-tax jurisdictions is associated with both low foreign tax rates on foreign
income and high federal tax rates on foreign income.
The paper introduces a new method which could shed some light on a number of findings of
the previous literature. In particular, the findings on the METB might explain the counter-
intuitive result in Markle and Shackelford [2011]: AETRs and METRs are not sufficient tools
for the comparison of the tax burden in worldwide and territorial systems, as they depend on
statutory rates. If countries with a low statutory tax rate and a worldwide taxation system
are overrepresented (for example, Ireland), the AETRs and the METRs could be driven by
low statutory tax rates.
3 Data
The tax burdens and effects of tax haven operations on group tax payments are investigated
using ORBIS, a database recording balance sheet and profit and loss (P&L) account items
for companies all over the world. The dataset is created by Bureau van Dijk and is based on
the mandatory information from filed and publicly available accounts. The online version of
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ORBIS used here5 includes only large and very large companies.6 The unit of observation
is a group of companies filing consolidated accounts together, under the name of a parent
company, called the global ultimate owner (GUO).7
This paper employs consolidated accounts and therefore it identifies the determinants of the
tax liabilities of the group instead of the single affiliate.8
The sample consists of 3,389 industrial corporate groups up to five years (2003–2007) for a
total of 12,876 observations distributed across 15 OECD countries (tables 1 and 2). GUOs
are classified as multinationals (MNCs) if they own foreign subsidiaries (with more than 50
per cent of their capital). The rest of the companies are classified as domestic. For descrip-
tive purposes, multinationals are then classified further into two groups: those with at least
one subsidiary in tax havens (TH) and those without any operations in offshore centres.
There are large differences in the number of companies reported for each country (see Table
1). Differences are due to different reporting requirements and different industrial structures.
For example, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States have large multinationals,
whilst countries such as Spain are characterised by smaller and less international groups. US
and UK global ultimate owners represent about 55 per cent and 19 per cent of the sample
respectively, together forming a total of almost 75 per cent. More than half of the remain-
ing quarter are German, French, and Swedish groups. The distribution of the observations
across years is shown in Table 2.
All countries in the sample exempt foreign profits except Ireland, the United Kingdom, and
the United States. The United Kingdom adopted a territorial system in 2009 and the new
5The version of ORBIS used in this paper was accessed on 16 October 2008.
6Bureau van Dijk defines large and very large companies as those having operating revenue greater than
13 million $US (10 million EUR) or total assets greater than 26 million $US (20 million EUR) or a number
of employees greater then 150 headcounts.
7For more details on the sample construction, see Appendix A.
8For more details on why consolidated accounts are used, see Appendix B.
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rules apply from the fiscal year 2009–2010 (not included in the sample used here). The
statutory corporate tax rates which include local taxes as well are reported in Table 3.
Following Desai et al. [2006], we define tax havens as countries with both a low or zero
corporate income tax rate and a very business oriented legislation which often features bank
secrecy. In this way, 38 countries are classified as tax havens and divided between large
and small low-tax jurisdictions (see Table 4). Among others, the former group includes two
OECD countries (Ireland and Switzerland) and two Asian tigers (Hong Kong and Singapore).
Small tax havens include differing jurisdictions ranging from Caribbean islands such as the
Bahamas and the Cayman Islands to archipelagos in the Indian Ocean such as Mauritius
and the Seychelles, through to European small countries such as Liechtenstein, Luxembourg,
and Malta.9 In the sample, the most popular low-tax jurisdictions are large countries such
as Switzerland, Singapore, Ireland, and Hong Kong reflecting the wider opportunities of
their larger and more developed economies (see Table 5). Ultimate owners of all 15 coun-
tries are present in the four large low-tax jurisdictions. More specifically, Switzerland is the
most popular low-tax location for Austrian, German, Danish, Finnish, French, Dutch, and
Swedish companies. Ireland is the favourite destination of UK companies whilst Singapore
is the prevailing choice for US multinationals, followed by Hong Kong and Ireland. For US
global ultimate owners, the pattern of tax haven operations is similar to the one in Dyreng
and Lindsey [2009] who find that US companies locate their low-tax subsidiaries mainly in
Singapore, Hong Kong, Switzerland, Ireland, Barbados, Bermuda, and the Cayman Islands
(see Table 5). In the sample used here, among small tax havens, the most popular is Luxem-
bourg. It is the first destination for Belgian GUOs whilst remaining important for Spanish,
Greek (second destination), French, and Swiss companies (third destination). Bermuda,
the Cayman Islands, the British Virgin Islands, and Barbados are also prominent small tax
9Table 4 does not provide an exhaustive list of low-tax jurisdictions. Some tax havens such as the
Maldives, the Isle of Man, and the Channel Islands are not included. Table 4 includes only the offshore fiscal
centres in which the ultimate owners in the sample own a subsidiary.
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havens. Bermuda, the Cayman Islands, and Barbados are strongly dominated by US com-
panies whilst about one fourth of the subsidiaries in the British Virgin Islands are UK-owned.
The identification strategy of some of the regressions in this paper rely on measuring the
change in the consolidated tax bill after tax haven operations have been expanded or reduced:
groups with more extensive offshore operations are expected to have a lower tax bill. To
implement this strategy, the extent of tax haven operations of each group must be identified.
This can be done in ORBIS as it provides information on the country of residence of the im-
mediate subsidiaries of the ultimate owner filing the consolidated accounts.10 Unfortunately,
ORBIS contains only time-invariant information on the ownership structure.11 To create a
time-varying variable recording the number of subsidiaries in offshore low-tax centres, the
dataset is merged with ZEPHYR. To my knowledge, this is the first publicly available cross-
country dataset with time-varying ownership of low-tax off-shore jurisdictions. This specific
structure of the dataset allows to compare tax burdens across countries whilst controlling
for econometric biases due to endogeneity, as explained in more details in Section 4.1 and in
Appendix A and C.
Descriptive statistics for the entire sample, the sample of companies headquartered in ter-
ritorial jurisdictions, and the sample of companies resident in worldwide jurisdictions are
shown in Table 6. Companies in the last two groups do not differ substantially in terms of
mean tax bill (over total assets), mean profitability (when positive), and mean size (measured
by log(employees)). Nonetheless, companies in worldwide jurisdictions report consolidated
losses more frequently (27 versus 16 per cent of observations in territorial countries) and
when they do so, they report larger losses over total assets (a mean value of -.26 versus -.11
in territorial jurisdictions). Companies in territorial jurisdictions are more likely to have at
10The online version of ORBIS contains information on second- and further-level subsidiaries but it is not
possible to download it in a format processable with standard econometric softwares.
11The information refers to the last available year, mainly 2007.
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least one tax haven subsidiary (53 per cent versus 37 per cent). Their mean number of low-
tax off-shore subsidiaries is also higher (2.5 versus 1.9) but with a lower standard deviation
(5.66 versus 6.28). Companies in worldwide jurisdictions are more intangible intensive, with
a mean value of intangibles over total assets of 0.22 (versus 0.15) and a maximum value of
0.97 (versus 0.86).
In the sample, multinationals are evenly split between those with and those without first-level
tax haven subsidiaries (see Table 7). Each of the two groups represents about 40 per cent of
the total GUOs. Most of the individual countries are characterised by a higher proportion
of multinational ultimate owners without offshore first-level subsidiaries, with the exception
of Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland.
Multinationals with operations in tax havens are on average not only the most profitable
but also the least likely to run losses (see tables 7 and 8). Additionally, their losses are the
smallest on average. These factors explain their higher tax bill (divided by total assets):
higher profits lead to higher tax charges, ceteris paribus. It is therefore crucial to control
for profitability and size when comparing tax burdens across firms. Ultimate owners with
subsidiaries in low-tax jurisdictions are also the largest in terms of number of employees and
of number of total subsidiaries, including non-tax havens subsidiaries.
4 Empirical Model and Empirical Challenges
The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, it evaluates whether and how the worldwide
system of taxation of foreign profits implies a higher fiscal burden compared to the territorial
system. Second, it assesses how tax haven operations impact on the tax bill of a corporate
group. It tests whether groups headquartered in territorial jurisdictions reduce their tax
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bill through tax avoidance to a relatively greater extent than do groups headquartered in
worldwide jurisdictions.
To motivate the empirical analysis illustrated later in this paper, the consolidated profit of
a corporate group with operations both at home (H) and abroad (F) can be described with
a stylised model where a MNC headquartered in country H owns a subsidiary in country F.
Assume that at the beginning of the period, total profits of piA are generated, of which a
fraction (1 − d) arises at home and a fraction d arises abroad in country F. At the end of
the period, profits are repatriated from F to H. No new profits are produced in period 2. It
is therefore possible to write:
Π∗ = piA − T (1)
where for a corporate group headquartered in a territorial country, T = TT :
TT = τ
H [piA(1− d)(1− ξH)] + τF [piAd(1− ξF )] (2)
For a corporate group headquartered in a worldwide country, T = TW :
TW = τ
HpiA(1− d)(1− ξH) + τFpiAd(1− ξF )+
+τHpiAd(1− ξH)− τFpiAd(1− ξF ) =
= τHpiA(1− ξH)
(3)
τH is the statutory corporate tax rate in the home country and τF is the statutory corporate
tax rate in country F. Without loss of generality, I assume that τH > τF . ξH and ξF
represent the proportion of accounting profit which does not form part of the taxable profit
at home and aborad, respectively.12
12The main results of the model hold if I assume that only a fraction ψ of foreign profits d is repatriated
from F to H. For simplification purposes, here I assume ψ = 1.
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It is possible to define the marginal effective tax rate (METR) as
METRT =
∂TT
∂piA
= τH(1− d)(1− ξH) + τFd(1− ξF ) (4)
and
METRW =
∂TW
∂piA
= τH(1− ξH) (5)
The METR measures the increase in the consolidated tax bill when consolidated accounting
profits increase by one dollar. It can be showed that METRW > METRT if τ
H(1− ξH) >
τF (1− ξF ).
Three components affect the METR: the statutory rate τH , the statutory rate τF and the tax
base, determined by ξ. To isolate the effect of the statutory tax rates on the tax burden of a
firm, I introduce the marginal effective tax base (METB), that is the increase in the tax base
for a unitary increase in accounting profit. The METB for a corporate group headquartered
in a territorial jurisdiction is
METBT = (1− d)(1− ξH) + d(1− ξF ) (6)
whilst for a group headquartered in a worldwide country, the METB is
METBW = (1− ξH) (7)
It can be showed that METBW > METBT if d(ξ
H − ξF ) < 0. In other words, if the
deductions on the tax base in H (ξH) are smaller than the deductions on the tax base in F
(ξF ), the METB of a group headquartered in a worldwide jurisdiction will be larger than
the METB of a group headquartered in a territorial jurisdiction.
Let’s also assume that corporate groups are engaged in profit shifting activities (s) towards
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a tax haven with a statutory corporate tax rate τTH = 0.
Π∗ = piA − T − γ1
2
s21 −
γ2
2
s22 −
γ3
2
s23 (8)
For a corporate group headquartered in a territorial country:
TT = τ
H [piA(1− d)(1− ξH − s1)− s2K − s3I] + τF [piAd(1− ξF )] (9)
For a corporate group headquartered in a worldwide country:
TW = τ
H [piA(1− ξH − s1)− s2K − s3I] (10)
K represents consolidated total assets. The amount of profit shifted to the tax haven can
either be proportional to accounting profit (s1) and (or) be associated with other character-
istics of the firm such as size K (s2) or the amount of intangible assets I (s3). Two corporate
groups with the same profitability may be able to shift different amounts of profits around
the world. In particular, larger firms may have more opportunities to relocate earnings in
one of their many subsidiaries. Intangible assets could also have an important role in profit-
shifting activities. For US-owned MNCs, Grubert [2003] argues that half of the difference
between their profitability in low-tax and high-tax subsidiaries can be explained by transfer
of intellectual property. The terms γ1
2
s21,
γ2
2
s22, and
γ3
2
s23 represent the cost of profit shifting
entailed by the resources needed to set up tax avoidance schemes and by the legal expenses
arising if such schemes are contested by the tax authorities or by the minority shareholders.
Such costs are assumed not to be tax deductible.
For simplification, suppose the only decision variables are the amounts of profit shifted to
the tax haven.13 The firm maximises its overall profit by choosing to shift optimal amounts
13Without loss of generality, I assume that d, the fraction of total profit produced abroad in F does not
depend on the firm’s decisions but it is taken as given. This assumption should not be problematic in the
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of profits s∗1, s
∗
2, and s
∗
3 such that:
s∗T,1 =
τHpiA(1− d)
γ1
and s∗W,1 =
τHpiA
γ1
(11)
where s∗T,1 is the optimal amount of shifted profit s1 for a corporate group headquartered
in a territorial jurisdiction and s∗W,1 is the optimal amount of s1 for a corporate group
headquartered in a worldwide jurisdiction. s∗2 and s
∗
3 do not vary across jurisdictions and
can be derived as follows:
s∗2 =
τHK
γ2
(12)
s∗3 =
τHI
γ3
(13)
Equations (11), (12), and (13) indicate that the corporate group shifts profits to the tax
haven jurisdiction as long as τH > 0.
The data described in Section 3 do not contain information on the flows of profits between
the subsidiaries and the ultimate owner.14 Only the number of tax havens subsidiaries
is available. Additionally, during the sample period, very few companies in the sample
switch from having zero tax haven subsidiaries to having at least one low-tax subsidiary (or
viceversa).15 Given the restrictions placed on this analysis by the data, in the empirical
specification below the profit-shifting functions s1, s2, and s3 are represented as a general
quadratic function of the number of tax havens subsidiaries such that:
s1 = δ1n+ δ2n
2 (14)
short term.
14I am not aware of any publicly available datasets containing unconsolidated account information for tax
haven subsidiaries, which generally do not have the obligation or the incentive to disclose accounting data.
15For a more detailed discussion on why dummies have not been used here, see the Appendix D.
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s2 = φ1n+ φ2n
2 (15)
s3 = λ1n+ λ2n
2 (16)
Substituting (14), (15), and (16) in equations (9) and (10), dividing through by K and
rearranging, it is possible to write
TT = {τH [piA(1− d)(1− ξH − δ1n− δ2n2)− (φ1n+ φ2n2)K+
−(λ1n+ λ2n2)I] + τFpiAd(1− ξF )} ∗ 1
K
(17)
and
TW = τ
H [piA(1− ξH − δ1n− δ2n2)− (φ1n+ φ2n2)K+
−(λ1n+ λ2n2)I] ∗ 1
K
(18)
Equation (17) and (18) can be combined in the same regression using a dummy variable dW
which takes value one if the company is headquartered in a worldwide jurisdiction and zero
otherwise. The estimated equation will be
Yi,t = α0 + α1(
piA
K
)i,t + α2(
piA
K
)i,t ∗ dWi,t+
α3(
piA
K
n)i,t + α4(
piA
K
n2)i,t+
α5(
piA
K
n)i,t ∗ dWi,t + α6(pi
A
K
n2)i,t ∗ dWi,t+
+σ1ni,t + σ2n
2
i,t
+ρ1(
I
K
n)i,t + ρ2(
I
K
n2)i,t + fi + i,t
(19)
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where
α1 = τ
H(1− d)(1− ξH) + τFd(1− ξF );
α2 = τ
Hd(1− ξH)− τFd(1− ξF );
α3 = δ1τ
H(1− d); α4 = δ2τH(1− d);
α5 = δ1τ
Hd; α6 = δ2τ
Hd;
σ1 = φ1τ
H ; σ2 = φ2τ
H ;
ρ1 = λ1τ
H ; ρ2 = λ2τ
H
(20)
Yi,t is the tax charged to the consolidated P&L account divided by total assets;
16 piA is
accounting profitability and it is measured as P&L before taxation;17 K is capital stock,
measured by the book value of total assets; I represents intangibles measured by the book
value of intangible fixed assets; n is the extent of tax haven operations and it is measured
by the number of subsidiaries located in the low-tax jurisdictions listed in Table 4.
In equation (19), α1 measures the METR for a group without tax haven operations and
headquartered in a territorial jurisdiction (that is, dW =0 and n=0):
α1 =
∂(T/K)
∂(piA/K)
=
∂T
∂piA
= METR (21)
For a corporate group headquartered in a worldwide jurisdiction (that is, dW =1), the METR
is
∂(T/K)
∂(piA/K)
=
∂T
∂piA
= α1 + α2 (22)
Equation (19) allows the group tax payments to change when the size of operations in tax
16For more details on the variables used, see Appendix A.
17P&L before tax is net of royalties and interest payments. Even if there is shifting of profits to low-tax
subs, this should not be a problem in this study: in consolidated accounts, flows within the multinational
group will be compensated with each other.
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havens changes. In this context, it is possible to estimate the extent to which the group
METR drops when more offshore operations become available within a corporate group. α3
and α4 measure the additional effect on the METR of an increase of one unit in the num-
ber of tax havens subsidiaries (and headquartered in territorial countries); α3 is expected
to be negative, as the METR should decline when tax haven operations are available; α4
captures the non-linear effects of tax haven operations on the METR. For companies with
tax haven operations and headquartered in territorial jurisdictions, the METR is given by
(α1 +α3n+α4n
2). For corporate groups headquartered in worldwide jurisdictions, the total
METR is measured by (α1 + α2 + α3n+ α4n
2 + α5n+ α6n
2).
The coefficient σ1 captures the effect of tax haven operations independently of profitability
(direct effect); σ1 is expected to be negative. σ2 captures any non-linear relationship between
tax haven operations and the corresponding conditional expectation of Yi,t.
Intangible assets such as patents and copyrights are often used to transfer profits from high-
to low-tax jurisdictions: they can be moved relatively easily and arm’s length prices are
difficult to establish for them. Since a higher concentration of intangibles creates more op-
portunities for transfer-pricing, ρ1 is expected to be negative. ρ2 captures non-linear effects
of low-tax operations.
Two elements affect the METR: the statutory rates and the tax base. For a comparison of
tax burdens between territorial and worldwide jurisdictions, it is important to understand
which element affects the difference in tax burdens across jurisdictions. The METB is able
to isolate the effect statutory rates from the effect of the tax base. It is possible to estimate
the METB if equation (19) is transformed as follows:
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(23)
where τH is the statutory corporate tax rates in the home country.
Approximating T ≈ (τH ∗ tax base),
β1 =
∂(T/K)
∂(piA ∗ τH/K) =
∂T
∂piA ∗ τH =
=
∂(τH ∗ tax base)
∂piA ∗ τH =
∂(tax base)
∂piA
= METB
(24)
β1 measures the METB for a group without tax haven operations and headquartered in a
territorial jurisdiction. This means that an additional dollar of accounting profits increases
the tax base by β1 cents. β3 and β4 measure the additional effect for a group increasing
its number of tax havens subsidiaries by one unit (and headquartered in territorial coun-
tries); β3 is expected to be negative, as the METB should decline when tax haven operations
are available; β4 captures the non-linear effects of tax haven operations on the METB.
For companies with tax haven operations and headquartered in territorial jurisdictions, the
marginal increase in the tax base for an additional dollar of accounting profit is given by
(β1 + β3n+ β4n
2).
For corporate groups headquartered in worldwide jurisdictions, the total METB is captured
by (β1 + β2 + β3n+ β4n
2 + β5n+ β6n
2).
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Note that using (4) and (5), it is possible to write
∂TT
∂(piA ∗ τH) =
∂TT
∂piA
∗ 1
τH
= (1− d)(1− ξH) + t
F
tH
d(1− ξF ) (25)
for a corporate group headquartered in a territorial jurisdiction and
∂TW
∂(piA ∗ τH) =
∂TW
∂piA
∗ 1
τH
= (1− ξH) = METBW (26)
for a corporate group headquartered in a worldwide jurisdiction.
In the consolidated data used here it is not possible to disentangle (1 − d)(1 − ξH) from
d(1− ξF ) as in equation (25). Also the data do not contain information on all jurisdictions
where the MNC is located. Therefore, in the empirical analysis τF is approximated with
τH , the statutory corporate tax rate applied in the jurisdiction where the corporate group
is headquartered. For a corporation headquartered in a territorial jurisdiction, a bias could
arise. If τF < τH (τF > τH) the results of this paper will underestimate (overestimate)
the METB of a corporate group headquartered in a territorial jurisdiction, as showed in
equation (25). The lower (higher) τF with respect to τH , the larger the downward (upward)
bias. The problem does not arise when estimating the METB for a group headquartered in
a worldwide jurisdiction when all the profits in F are repatriated to H (ψ = 1), as showed
in equation (26). If ψ < 1, the estimated METB for a corporate group headquartered in
a worldwide jurisdiction will also be underestimated (overestimated) if τF < τH (τF > τH).18
4.1 Empirical challenges
In the setting analysed here, there are three econometric issues that need to be addressed.
The first is the possible endogeneity of tax haven operations. The choice of setting up oper-
18In this case, the real METB will be METBW = (1− d−ψ ∗ d)(1− ξH) + (d−ψ ∗ d)(1− ξF ) whilst the
estimated METB will be M̂ETBW = (1− d− ψ ∗ d)(1− ξH) + τFτH (d− ψ ∗ d)(1− ξF ).
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ations in low-tax jurisdictions might be determined by the profit and hence by the tax bill
itself. Table 8 shows that groups without tax haven operations are more likely to report
losses, and their losses are larger than those of groups present in tax havens. Unprofitable
companies have less profits to shift and therefore they will gain less from tax haven op-
erations, as they are already able to reduce their tax bill through the loss carryforward
provisions. Alternatively, losses can be produced because no low-tax off-shore operations
are available. This implies that the selection of only profitable companies can bias the es-
timations towards finding a negative effect of tax haven subsidiaries on tax liabilities as
profitable firms have a greater incentive to locate part of their operations in offshore low-tax
jurisdictions. Two key implications can be drawn from Table 8. First, unprofitable entities
and unprofitable years should be included in the sample. Second, the presence in tax havens
is likely to be determined endogenously by previous tax positions. This paper tackles the
first issue by including unprofitable entities and years in which a group reports an aggregate
loss and the second issue by using a dynamic model where the tax bill (over total assets) is
regressed on its first lag.
The second econometric issue stems from the likely presence of unobservable group fixed
effects and unobservable time-variant shocks which simultaneously affect the tax bill and the
decision to locate activities in tax havens. The third issue concerns regressors other than the
number of tax haven subsidiaries. Important determinants of the tax bill such as profitability
and intangibles intensity could be determined simultaneously with the tax bill. This paper
deals with the last two issues by first constructing a time-variant indicator for tax haven op-
erations and then by using the GMM-diff estimator described in Arellano and Bond [1991].
The GMM-diff estimator controls for unobserved fixed effects by using first-differences. It
also controls for unobserved time-variant shocks with the use of instrumental variables. As
standard in Arellano and Bond [1991], instruments employed are the second and further lags
of profitability, intangible intensity, size, and of their interactions with the dummy indicat-
ing whether a corporate group is headquartered in a jurisdiction with a worldwide system
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of taxation of profits. Other instruments are the first and second lag of the previous two
periods’ average tax bill divided by total assets. Country-year dummies are also included in
the instrument set.19
5 Results
This section describes the results. In all specifications presented here, the diagnostic tests
are successfully passed. The test for over-identification and the tests for first and second
order serial correlation are satisfactory. The null hypothesis of first order serial correlation is
rejected and the null hypothesis of second order serial correlation is not rejected. Under the
Sargan-Hansen test, the joint null hypothesis that the instruments are uncorrelated with the
error term, and that they are correctly excluded from the estimated equation is not rejected.
Table 9 presents results for a basic specification of equation (19) where subsidiaries in tax
havens are not considered and the dependent variable is the ratio of consolidated tax charges
to the consolidated book value of total assets.20 The regressions also control for aggregate
losses and for the size of the corporate group. Columns 1 and 3 report results for the entire
sample, whilst column 2 and 4 investigate only multinational firms.
In columns 1 to 4, the METR for companies headquartered in a territorial jurisdiction and
estimated by the coefficient of profitability α1 is highly statistically significant. It remains so
across all specifications in this paper. Its magnitude is estimated to be around 17 per cent.
This means that on average for companies in a territorial country, a one dollar increase in
the consolidated accounting profit leads to about a 17 cents increase in the consolidated tax
liabilities. In column 1 and 2, the coefficient α2 on the interaction term between profitability
19For more details on the estimator and the instruments used in this paper, see Appendix C.
20For presentational purposes, in the regressions the dependent variable and its lag value have been mul-
tiplied by 100 so that the coefficient attached to profitability can be interpreted as a percentage.
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and the dummy for worldwide countries21 is positive and highly significant. This implies
that the METR of companies headquartered in worldwide jurisdictions is estimated to be
significantly higher, by around 19 (for the whole sample) and 18 (for multinationals only)
percentage points than the METR of companies resident in territorial jurisdictions.
As discussed in Section 4.1, it is important to control for losses, as companies with negative
earnings might display a lower tax bill. In column 1 to 4, the coefficient of the dummy
indicating an aggregate loss is instead positive and significant. This might seem counter-
intuitive. However it is possible that an ultimate owner has a positive tax bill even when it
reports losses in the consolidated accounts. In fact some of its subsidiaries might be prof-
itable and therefore might be paying taxes, even if total group losses are larger than the
profits of those subsidiaries.22
It is known that larger firms tend to have more intangibles. To identify the effects of in-
tangibles separately from size, it is useful to control for both intangibles and size.23 In the
specifications presented in column 1 to 4, the coefficient of intangible intensity is not sta-
tistically significant at conventional levels.24 The effect of size on the tax bill seems more
complex to analyse. In column 1 to 4, the significant and negative effect of the coefficient
attached to the logarithm of employment indicates that larger firms headquartered in ter-
ritorial countries display a slightly lower ratio of taxes to total assets. This is unsurprising
as larger firms have more opportunity to shift income to low tax subsidiaries than smaller
firms do. For corporate groups headquartered in worldwide jurisdictions, the overall effect
is instead not significantly different from zero.
21The dummy dW takes value one when the GUO is resident in a jurisdiction which applies a worldwide
system for the taxation of corporate profits.
22The interaction between the dummy for reporting losses and the dummy for worldwide countries is never
significant. For this reason, the variable is not included in the regressions.
23Size is measured by the logarithm of the number of employees. For more details, see Appendix A.
24Despite its coefficient being estimated as not significant at conventional level, the variable intangibles
over total assets is kept in the analysis. It will become important and its coefficient will be estimated at a
conventional significant level in later specifications.
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A key question in this investigation is whether the higher METR found for worldwide juris-
dictions is driven by characteristics of individual countries and their legislation. Column 3
and 4 investigate this issue by substituting the dummy for worldwide jurisdictions with three
separate dummies for Ireland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. By interacting
country dummies with the profitability term, the last two columns explain in more details
the determinants of the difference in METRs between worldwide and territorial jurisdictions.
The corporate groups headquartered in the United States are characterised by the highest
METR which is between 19 (for the whole sample) and 16 (for MNCs only) percentage points
higher than the mean METR of groups headquartered in territorial countries. The METR
for groups headquartered in the US is therefore estimated to be between 33.5 (column 4) and
35.5 per cent (column 3). Companies headquartered in the United Kingdom have a METR
of between 28.5 per cent (column 3) and 29.8 per cent (column 4), around 12 percentage
points higher than companies headquartered in territorial countries.25 Irish companies dis-
play an overall METR which is not statistically different from that of groups headquartered
in territorial countries. This is expected as Ireland has the lowest corporate tax rate among
OECD countries (12.5 per cent) and no Controlled Foreign Corporation (CFC) rules, despite
being in principle a worldwide jurisdiction.
The results of Table 9 might lead me to think that corporate groups headquartered in coun-
tries which exempt foreign profits are able to reduce overall tax liabilities by locating real
activities and by shifting profits into jurisdictions that can guarantee a lower fiscal burden.
However the difference between the METR of the two groups cannot be entirely attributed
to the different ways in which foreign profits are taxed. The METR of each company is also
influenced by the statutory corporate tax rate.
25It is interesting to note that in our sample, multinationals display a METR which is not systematically
lower than that of domestic entities. This seems to depend on the country of residence. This is consistent
with the results in Markle and Shackelford [2011].
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As discussed in the previous section, equation (23) is estimated to control for the national
statutory corporate tax rates. Table 10 reports the results for the estimation of equation
(23) without controlling for tax haven operations. As in the previous table, the regressions
also control for losses and size. Column 1 and 2 display findings for a model where the
profitability variable is interacted with a dummy dW taking the value one when the GUO
is resident in a jurisdiction applying a worldwide system. Column 3 and 4 display estimates
for a model where dummies for individual worldwide countries are interacted with the prof-
itability term. Column 1 and 3 illustrate outcomes for the whole sample, whilst column 2
and 4 show findings for multinationals only.
From a general perspective, column 1 to 4 report a statistically significant estimate of the
coefficient β1 attached to the profitability term multiplied by τ
H , the national statutory cor-
porate tax rate in the country of headquarters. The METB β1 is estimated to be 83 per cent
in column 1. This means that an additional dollar of accounting profit increases the tax base
by 83 cents. In column 2 where domestic entities are excluded, the estimate is a little lower
(80.3 per cent). In column 3 and 4, β1 is estimated at around 82 and 81 per cent, respectively.
From Table 10 it is clear that when controlling for the corporate statutory tax rate, there
is no statistically significant difference between worldwide and territorial countries in how
an additional dollar is transformed in additional tax base. In column 1 to 4, the METB
measured by the coefficient β2 is never statistically significant. In other words, once one
controls for statutory rates, the difference in tax burdens between worldwide and territorial
countries disappears. It seems therefore natural to think that differences in METRs and
AETRs found in Table 9 and in other studies (Markle and Shackelford [2011]) are mainly
driven by statutory rates.
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In the specifications of Table 10 the coefficient attached to the dummy indicating consoli-
dated losses remains positive and highly statistically significant. The other variables are not
significant in this model.
This paper also investigates the different systems of taxation of foreign profits by testing
their resilience to tax avoidance, to which the territorial system is considered more vulnera-
ble. Table 11 and 12 control for this using the presence of the corporate groups in tax havens.
Presence in offshore low-tax jurisdictions is measured by the number of first-level subsidiaries
in tax havens.26 The specifications of Table 11 and 12 are obtained by interacting the vari-
ables of the previous specifications with the variable recording the number of tax haven
subsidiaries within the same corporate group. Some interacted variables are then dropped
if their estimated coefficient is not statistically significant at conventional levels in any of
the specifications. This should reduce multicollinearity problems and shrink the number of
instruments.
In Table 11, column 1 and 2 present results for a model where one unique dummy for world-
wide countries is interacted with the profitability term and with the number of subsidiaries
in tax havens and their squared number. Column 3 and 4 display findings for a model where
country-specific dummies for Ireland, the United Kingdom, and the United States are inter-
acted with the profitability term. Regressions reported in column 1 and 3 are run on the
entire sample, whilst column 2 and 4 are run on multinationals only.
In the first column, the METR for groups headquartered in territorial jurisdictions is esti-
mated to be around 21 per cent and highly significant across different specifications. There
is also a negative and statistically significant effect of low-tax operations on the METR as
26The presence in tax havens could have also been recorded using dummies. For more details on why this
is not a suitable choice for this study, see Appendix D.
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α3 is negative and statistically significant. The coefficient α4 is also significant at one per
cent indicating a non-linear relationship. Considering a corporate group headquartered in a
territorial jurisdiction with 2.5 tax haven subsidiaries,27 the coefficient estimates imply that
its METR will be 1.7 percentage points lower than the METR of companies without tax
haven subsidiaries, ceteris paribus.
This paper compares the tax burden of corporate groups headquartered in territorial juris-
dictions with that of similar entities in worldwide countries. A crucial result is the sign of
the coefficient α5 attached to the interaction between profitability, the worldwide countries
dummy, and the number of tax haven operations. A positive sign would indicate that, for
companies headquartered in worldwide jurisdictions, tax haven subsidiaries have a smaller
negative impact28 on the METR with respect to corporate groups resident in territorial
countries. In column 1 the sign of the coefficient is positive but not statistically significant.
In column 2 to 4, the coefficient is positive and statistically significant. To better grasp the
meaning of these results, using the coefficients of column 2, it is useful to calculate the effect
of one tax haven subsidiary for a group headquartered in a territorial jurisdiction versus a
group headquartered in a worldwide jurisdiction. For the former, the METR will be reduced
by -0.844 + 0.027 percentage points, for a total of 0.817 percentage points. For the latter,
the METR will be reduced by (-0.844 + 0.027 + 0.027 - 0.025) for a total of 0.17 percentage
points. Coefficient estimates are very similar across all specification of column 2, 3 and 4.
It is therefore possible to conclude that Table 11 presents evidence that low tax offshore
operations reduce the METR more in territorial than in worldwide jurisdictions. Territorial
systems seem to be more vulnerable to tax avoidance through tax havens.
As in previous specifications, the coefficient of the dummy recording whether the corporate
27The sample mean value of the variable number of subsidiaries in tax havens is 2.5. For more details see
Table 6.
28Clearly, the magnitude of the coefficient has to be smaller than the magnitude of the coefficient attached
to the interaction between the profitability variable and the number of subsidiaries in tax havens.
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group reports a consolidated loss is positive and statistically significant in column 1 to 4.
This positive effect is however reduced by the use of tax haven operations as indicated by the
negative and statistically significant value of the coefficient on the interaction term between
the indicator for losses and the number of subsidiaries in tax havens. This provides evidence
that the combined presence of aggregate losses and operations in low-tax jurisdictions re-
duces the tax burden of the corporate group. For the losses variable, there is no difference
between worldwide and territorial jurisdictions.29
Low-tax offshore operations also reduce tax liabilities through the use of intangibles as shown
by the negative and highly significant coefficient of the interaction between tax haven sub-
sidiaries and intangible assets in all columns of Table 11. The relationship with the dependent
variable is non-linear as the coefficient of the variable interacted with the squared value of the
number of tax haven subsidiaries is statistically significant at one per cent. In the previous
tables, the coefficient attached to intangibles intensity was never estimated at a level con-
ventionally considered significant. This means that, without low tax operations, intangibles
per se do not seem to reduce tax liabilities (over total assets). In the sample used here, it is
the combination between intangibles and low-tax operations which produces tax savings for
the group.
As in previous tables, the significant and negative effect of the coefficient attached to the
size variable indicates that larger firms headquartered in territorial countries display a lower
ratio of taxes to total assets. For corporate groups headquartered in worldwide jurisdictions,
the overall effect of size on the tax bill is not statistically significant from zero. The result
are robust across all specifications of Table 11.
With the exception of column 2, all specifications also identify a negative and statistically
29The interaction between the worldwide countries dummy, the loss dummy, and the number of tax haven
subsidiaries is never significant. The variable is therefore dropped.
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significant direct effect of tax haven operations on the tax bill (σ1). As expected, offshore
operations reduce the ratio of tax charges to total assets. The relationship is non-linear as
the coefficient attached to the variable measuring the squared number of low tax subsidiaries
is positive and statistically significant in column 1 to 4. As explained in Appendix E, at
the mean, the effect is very large: one additional tax haven subsidiary reduces the tax bill
over total assets by 0.8 percentage points. This represents a reduction of 49 per cent in the
short run and by 53 per cent in the long run. Since the number of tax haven subsidiaries is
an imperfect measure of avoidance activities, the magnitude of the overall effect should be
interpreted with caution.
As discussed in the previous section, equation (23) is estimated to control for the national
statutory rates. Table 12 reports the results. From a general perspective, column 1 to 4
report a statistically significant estimate of the coefficient β1 attached to the profitability
term multiplied by τH , the national statutory corporate tax rate. β1 is the METB and it is
estimated to be 84 per cent in column 1. This means that an additional dollar of accounting
profit increases the tax base by 84 cents. In column 2 where domestic entities are excluded,
the estimate is very similar (83.3 per cent). In column 3 and 4, the dummy for worldwide
countries is replaced by three dummies separately indicating Ireland, the United States, and
the United Kingdom. In these columns, the METB is estimated at around 84 per cent as well.
As previously showed in Table 10, if the company does not have tax haven subsidiaries,
there is no statistically significant difference in the METB between worldwide and territorial
countries. In column 1 to 4 of Table 12, the coefficient of the interaction between the dummy
for worldwide countries (dW ) and the variable (piA ∗ τH)/K is never significant. When con-
trolling for the corporate statutory tax rates, there is no difference in how an additional
dollar is transformed in additional tax base.
Table 12 shows an interesting result, though. In column 1 to 4, the coefficient attached to
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the interaction between the dummy for worldwide countries, the number of tax havens (n),
and the variable (piA ∗ τH)/K is always positive and statistically significant (at least at 5
per cent). This confirms the results in the previous table and it means that in worldwide
countries the negative effect of tax haven operations on the METB (β1) is smaller than in
territorial countries. For example, column 1 reports that a company with one tax haven
subsidiary and headquartered in a territorial jurisdiction will be able to lower its METB
by 2.3 (-2.384 + 0.080) percentage points. The same type of company headquartered in a
worldwide jurisdiction will reduce its METB by only 0.24 (-2.384 + 0.080 + 2.144 - 0.076)
percentage points. The results suggest that tax haven operations exert a downward pressure
on the METB of the corporate groups in both the worldwide and the territorial system.
This pressure is more effective at reducing tax liabilities if the company is headquartered in
a jurisdiction which exempts foreign profits (versus a worldwide jurisdiction).
The sign and significance of the other coefficients remains the same as in the previous table.
The exceptions are the coefficients attached to the size variable. In column 1 and 3 of Table
12, the coefficient attached to size is negative but not significant. In column 2 and 4 where
only multinational companies are considered, the coefficient is instead significant, indicating
that larger MNCs in territorial countries are able to lower their tax bill (over total assets)
more than smaller MNCs are able to. In this model, there is no differential effect for corpo-
rate groups headquartered in worldwide jurisdictions.
6 Conclusions
This paper investigates whether the tax burden of companies located in worldwide juris-
dictions is systematically different from that of companies headquartered in territorial ju-
risdictions. The work employs consolidated accounting data for firms headquartered in 15
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OECD countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland,
the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United
States. Using financial information from ORBIS (2003–2007) and ownership changes con-
structed by merging ZEPHYR with ORBIS, this paper finds that the METR of companies
resident in territorial jurisdictions is lower than the METR of corporate groups headquar-
tered in jurisdictions applying the worldwide principle. More specifically, companies head-
quartered in the United States are characterised by the highest METR and UK companies
by the second highest METR.
When controlling for the headquarter corporate statutory tax rate, the difference in tax
burdens between worldwide and territorial jurisdictions disappears: there is no statistically
significant difference in how an additional dollar of accounting profit translates into additional
tax base. The METBs of groups headquartered in territorial countries are not statistically
different from METBs of groups headquartered in worldwide countries. A high statutory
tax rate is the key determinant of the difference in METRs.
This paper also investigates whether a territorial system for the taxation of corporate profits
is more vulnerable to tax avoidance activities. Using the availability of tax haven operations
for proxying tax avoidance activities, this work shows evidence consistent with tax haven
operations reducing tax liabilities in both, but more in territorial systems. Using low-tax
offshore operations, multinational companies headquartered in territorial countries reduce
their METR and their METB more than do corporate groups headquartered in a worldwide
country. This differential influence of tax haven subsidiaries in territorial jurisdictions is
robust to controlling for statutory tax rates.
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Appendix
Appendix A - Construction of the dataset
The dataset employed in this paper is constructed by merging ORBIS with ZEPHYR, both
produced by Bureau Van Dijk. The former contains financial information and firms’ owner-
ship structure as of 2007. The latter dataset contains mergers and acquisitions (M&A) deals
that occurred between 1999 and 2007, including acquisitions and (or) sell-off of affiliates in
tax havens. The unit of observation is a corporate group filing consolidated accounts under a
GUO firm. A GUO is a company that ultimately owns at least one subsidiary (with at least
a share of more than 50 per cent of capital). For the definition used by Bureau van Dijk, at
least one of the shareholders of the GUO must be known and this shareholder cannot own
more than 50 per cent.
By merging ORBIS and ZEPHYR, it is possible to create a time-varying ownership structure
using ORBIS ownership information as a starting point. In other words, if a company in
ORBIS appears in ZEPHYR as an acquirer and (or) as a vendor of a subsidiary located in
a tax haven, a time-varying variable recording the number of subsidiaries in offshore centres
can be built. For an example of how such a variable as been constructed see Table 13. For
a summary of the final dataset downloading and construction, see tables 14 and 15. The
dataset excludes GUOs which are insurance companies, financial companies, banks, hedge
funds, private equity firms, venture capital firms, mutual and pension funds, and public
authorities. The different sectors represented in the sample are showed in Table 16. The
observations of the final sample are less than 27,120 (see last rows of Table 14) because
companies with only one year of data are dropped in a dynamic model with one lagged
dependent variable. Also, the use of the instrumental variables and their lags reduces the
sample.
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To my knowledge this is the first publicly available, cross-country datasets constructed with
time-varying information on tax haven operations. The dataset used has also some limita-
tions, though. First, the variable recording the number of tax haven subsidiaries is built
starting from the static information recorded in ORBIS. This includes only first-level sub-
sidiaries. The empirical analysis is carried out using a GMM-diff and therefore the effect of
tax haven subsidiaries is identified only using the corporate groups which have increased or
decreased the number of their first level low-tax subsidiaries during the sample period. It
is important, however, to recognise that if a company has only second and further level tax
haven subsidiaries, it will not be used to produce the estimates. It is difficult to understand
in which direction the bias would be. Companies with first level tax haven subsidiaries could
be very special with respect to the average company with low-tax offshore operations. They
could also be thought of being more aggressive tax planners. In this case, the results would
overestimate the effect of tax haven subsidiaries for the whole population of companies in
the economy. On the contrary, it could be possible that corporate groups without first-level
tax haven subsidiaries but with less apparent and more complicated structures have greater
opportunities to shift profits to low-tax offshore jurisdictions. In this case, the results would
underestimate the real effect. Second, the time-varying changes in the number of tax haven
subsidiaries are built using ZEPHYR. The latter only records M&A deals. It does not record
whether a new subsidiary has been created. More generally, there might be an underestima-
tion of their presence in tax havens.
The variables used in the regressions are Yi,t, the tax (430)
30 charged to the consolidated
P&L account divided by total assets (412); piA symbolising accounting profitability measured
as P&L before taxation (429);31 K representing the capital stock which is measured by the
book value of total assets (412); I representing intangibles measured by the book value of
30The variables codes in ORBIS are given in parenthesis and in bold.
31P&L before tax is net of royalties and interest payments. Even if there is shifting of profits to low-tax
subs, this should not be a problem in this study: in consolidated accounts, flows within the multinational
group will be compensated with each other.
33
intangible fixed assets (405); size measured by the logarithm of the number of employees
(425); n the number of subsidiaries in tax havens.
Appendix B - The Use of Unconsolidated Accounts
In this paper, consolidated accounts are used. Unconsolidated accounts could lead to an
overestimation of the effective tax rate (ETR) and therefore also of the METR. Suppose
company A owns a subsidiary B located in a tax haven. Suppose that A borrows US$ 100
from B and pays 10 per cent interest. The parent company can deduct interest payments
from its tax base. If in the home country the statutory corporate tax rate is 30 per cent and
A reports a pre-tax profit of US$ 100, then its ETR is 30 per cent.32 Suppose additionally
that B reports profits only from interest payments received, and that its relevant statutory
corporate tax rate is zero. If consolidated data are used, the profit of the tax haven subsidiary
will be added to the profit of the parent and the ETR will drop to 27 per cent.33 Additionally,
unconsolidated data only give a partial picture of how offshore low-tax jurisdictions affect
tax liabilities. In fact, a reduction in the tax bill of one affiliate could be compensated for by
an increased tax bill somewhere else in the group. By failing to provide information on the
tax liabilities of the whole group, unconsolidated accounts are not suitable for comparing
the tax burdens of corporate groups resident in territorial countries with the tax burdens of
companies headquartered in worldwide countries. In an ideal word, unconsolidated financial
data for each subsidiary of a corporate group would be available. This would allow to identify
financial flows within the multinational company. Unfortunately, no such data are available
at present. For a discussion of the publicly and non-publicly available data, see Maffini
[2007]. ORBIS does not contain the unconsolidated accounts of all subsidiaries of the group.
When both consolidated and unconsolidated data are available for the same group, only a
32[ 0.3∗(100−10)(100−10) ] = 0.30.
33[ 0.3∗(100−10)(100−10)+10 ] = 0.27.
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few subsidiaries report detailed accounting information. Additionally, for some firms only
consolidated accounts are available. Finally, for their very own nature, even if a tax haven
subsidiary is recorded in ORBIS, its detailed unconsolidated accounts are never reported.
Appendix C - Discussion of the Estimator Used
All specifications presented in Section 5 include a lagged dependent variable which controls
for slow adjustments in the tax bill. Tax liabilities might depend on previous tax payments
for many reasons. For example, a company may arise the suspicion of tax authorities if it
shifts an amount of earnings that is too high with respect to previous years. In the first
column of Table 17, the OLS estimator does not control for group-specific effects, nor does
it deals with the likely correlation of the regressors with the error term. The within-group
estimator in column 2 controls for group fixed effects, but it does not deal with the bias
arising from the correlation between the regressors and the error term. Blundell et al. [2000]
showed that the pooled OLS estimator of the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable
is upward-biased, whilst the within-group estimator is downward-biased. Hence, columns 1
and 2 are useful for setting an upper and a lower bound to the estimates of the lagged de-
pendent variable shown in column 2 and obtained using a GMM-diff estimator. In columns
3 the estimated coefficient of the lagged dependent variable lies between the pooled OLS
value of column 1 (0.283) and its within-group equivalent displayed in column 2 (-0.023) as
predicted in Blundell et al. [2000]. More specifically, the estimated coefficient of the lagged
dependent variable is 0.079.
As explained above, the GMM-diff used in most specifications controls for unobservable
group fixed effects, and at the same time it deals with the likely correlation of unobservable
shocks with the first-difference of the lagged dependent variable and of other regressors. As
standard in Arellano and Bond [1991], instruments employed are the second and further lags
of profitability, intangible intensity, size, and of their interactions with the dummy indicating
35
whether a corporate group is headquartered in a jurisdiction with a worldwide system of tax-
ation of profits. Country-year dummies are also included in the instrument set. Instruments
are collapsed as described in Roodman [2009] to contain their proliferation.
The set of instruments used in the GMM-diff of Table 10 and 12 includes also the first and
second lag of the previous two periods’ average tax bill divided by total assets.34 The average
tax bill in the two previous periods is likely to be a good predictor of whether the company
decides to expand its tax haven operations or not. A group with a low-tax bill will be less
willing to incur the costs of expanding its operations in low-tax jurisdictions, ceteris paribus.
Other instruments employed are the second and further lags of profitability, intangible in-
tensity, size, and of their interactions with the dummy indicating whether a corporate group
is headquartered in a jurisdiction with a worldwide system of taxation of profits. Country
dummies are also included in the instrument set. The appropriate lags of these variables35
can be good instruments for the number of subsidiaries in tax havens as well. For example,
groups with higher profitability in the past have higher incentives to expand their tax haven
operations.
Specifications of table 9, 11, and 17 also include country-year dummies controlling for factors
in the country of the GUO likely to affect tax liabilities. Examples of such factors are the
extent of deductions from the tax base, the effectiveness of the anti-avoidance legislation, the
effectiveness of tax authorities in detecting tax avoidance and tax evasion, and the economic
cycle. Exceptions are Table 10 and 12 where only year dummies are included as one of
the regressors is the statutory corporate tax rate of the country of the headquarters. Such
34The average value of the tax bill divided by total assets for the previous two periods is calculated
as follows:
(
tax billt−1
tot.assetst−1 )+(
tax billt−2
tot.assetst−2 )
2 . The instruments used are therefore
(
tax billt−2
tot.assetst−2 )+(
tax billt−3
tot.assetst−3 )
2 and
(
tax billt−3
tot.assetst−3 )+(
tax billt−4
tot.assetst−4 )
2 .
35The appropriateness of the lagged values as instruments is tested using the Hansen test for the orthog-
onality of the instruments to the errors and the Arellano and Bond test to check whether there is serial
correlation in the error structure in the original equation.
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variable features the same pattern of variation as country-year dummies.
Appendix D - Dummies for Tax Havens Operations
The presence in tax havens could have been analysed by employing dummy indicators for
tax haven activity: the dummy would have taken value one in presence of at least one
low-tax off-shore subsidiary within the corporate group. To capture additional effects of a
large number of tax haven subsidiaries the study could have employed dummies registering
whether the group had two or more, three or more, four or more, and 30 or more36 tax
haven subsidiaries. Unfortunately, the aforementioned dummies would vary very little in
the sample used here. Table 18 shows that in the sample period employed, only a few
companies switch from owning zero to owning some tax haven subsidiaries. The variation
is even smaller for the dummies recording whether the corporate group has more than 2, 3,
4, or 30 low-tax offshore subsidiaries. With so little within-group variation the dummies are
unlikely to pick up the effects being studied here. As expected, the regressions run using
these dummies displayed insignificant coefficients. For brevity, results are not reported here
and are available with the author.
Appendix E - The Overall Effect of Tax Havens Operations on the
Tax Bill
In a polynomial model with interaction terms, coefficients are not directly interpretable as
the effect of their associated covariates depends on the value of the covariate itself and on
the value of the other regressors. To quantify the overall effect of an additional tax haven
subsidiary, it is useful to write:
36The top percentile for the variable ‘number of subsidiaries in tax havens’ is 30.
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∂Y
∂n
= α3
piA
K
+ 2α4
piA
K
n+ α5
piA
K
dW + 2α6
piA
K
dWn+
+σ1 + 2σ2n+
+ρ1
I
K
+ 2ρ2
I
K
n+
+ρ3dloss + 2ρ4dlossn+
+ρ5log(employees)dW + 2ρ6log(employees)dWn
(27)
It is possible to calculate the value of equation (27) for each observation of the sample by
multiplying the value of the estimated coefficients by the relevant variables. In this way, it is
possible to obtain a sample mean value for the derivative in equation (27). The sample mean
value for the derivative is -0.944, which applied to the sample mean value of the dependent
variable (1.929)37 indicates that an additional tax haven subsidiary reduces the tax liabilities
over total assets by about 49 per cent. The long-run effect is very similar, at about 53 per
cent.38
Since the amount of tax haven subsidiaries is just a proxy for avoidance activities, the size
of their overall effect on the tax bill (over total assets) should be interpreted with caution.
37For presentational purposes, the dependent variable in the regressions has been multiplied by 100.
38The calculations of the long-run effect are as follows: −0.944(1−0.074) = −1.019 and −1.0191.929 = −0.528.
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Table 1: Country Distribution by Type of Group
MNCs MNCs Domestic Total
with TH subs without TH subs groups (%)
Austria 15 [63] 9 [37] 0 24 (0.71)
Belgium 15 [68] 6 [27] 1 [5] 22 (0.65)
Denmark 15 [44] 18 [53] 1 [3] 34 (1.00)
Finland 21 [34] 36 [59] 4 [7] 61 (1.80)
France 112 [56] 68 [34] 20 [10] 200 (5.89)
Germany 105 [50] 83 [40] 22 [10] 210 (6.18)
Greece 8 [32] 16 [64] 1 [4] 25 (0.74)
Ireland* 9 [29] 20 [65] 2 [6] 31 (0.91)
Netherlands 34 [69] 12 [24] 3 [6] 49 (1.44)
Norway 10 [26] 28 [72] 1 [3] 39 (1.15)
Spain 20 [44] 24 [53] 1 [2] 45 (1.33)
Sweden 36 [42] 45 [53] 4 [5] 85 (2.51)
Switzerland 42 [70] 16 [27] 2 [3] 60 (1.77)
United Kingdom* 242 [38] 255 [40] 142 [22] 639 (18.86)
United States* 635 [34] 710 [38] 520 [28] 1,865 (55.03)
Total 1,319 (38.92) 1,346 (39.72) 724 (21.36) 3,389 (100)
(i) Figures indicate the number of ultimate owners.
(ii) In parenthesis, percentage of ultimate owners over the total sample.
(iii) In brackets, percentage over the total number of ultimate owners within a single
country. (iv) * Worldwide jurisdictions.
Table 2: Distribution of Observations Across Years
Year Frequency Percent
2003 2,115 16
2004 2,387 17
2005 2,610 20
2006 2,813 22
2007 2,951 23
Total 12,876 100.00
Table 3: Corporate Statutory Tax Rates (per cent)
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Austria 34 34 25 25 25
Belgium 33.99 33.99 33.99 33.99 33.99
Denmark 30 30 28 28 25
Finland 29 29 26 26 26
France 35.43 35.43 34.93 34.43 34.43
Germany 40.66 39.35 39.35 39.35 39.35
Greece 35 35 32 29 25
Ireland* 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5
The Netherlands 34.5 34.5 31.5 29.6 25.5
Norway 28 28 28 28 28
Spain 40.3 40.3 40.3 40.3 38.01
Sweden 28 28 28 28 28
Switzerland 21.3 21.3 21.3 21.3 21.3
United Kingdom* 30 30 30 30 30
United States* 40.75 40.75 39.52 39.52 38.3
(i) Statutory corporate tax rates include federal and local
rates. (ii) * Worldwide jurisdictions.
(iii) Source: PwC Worldwide Tax Summaries.
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Table 4: Classification of Tax Havens in the Sample
Small tax havens Large tax havens
Andorra (AD) Hong Kong (HK)
Anguilla (AI) Ireland (IE)
Antigua and Barbuda (AG) Lebanon (LB)
Aruba (AW) Liberia (LR)
Bahamas (BS) Panama (PA)
Bahrain (BH) Singapore (SG)
Barbados (BB) Switzerland (CH)
Belize (BZ)
Bermuda (BM)
Cayman Islands (KY)
Cyprus (CY)
Dominica (DM)
Gibraltar (GI)
Grenada (GD)
Iceland (IS)
Jordan (JO)
Liechtenstein (LI)
Luxembourg (LU)
Macau (MO)
Mauritius (MU)
Malta (MT)
Marshall Islands (MH)
Monaco (MC)
Netherlands Antilles (AN)
Saint Kitts and Nevis (KN)
Saint Lucia (LC)
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (VC)
Samoa (WS)
Seychelles (SC)
Vanuatu (VU)
Virgin Islands (British) (VG)
(i) Table 4 does not provide an exhaustive list of low-tax ju-
risdictions. Some tax havens such as the Maldives, the Isle
of Man, and the Channel Islands are not included. Table 4
includes only the offshore fiscal centres in which the ultimate
owners in the working sample own a subsidiary.
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Table 5: Subsidiaries in Each Tax Haven, by Country of GUO
Country of Global Ultimate Owner (GUO)
AT BE CH DE DK ES FI FR GR IE NL NO SE UK US Total
Tax havens
AD 2 1 3
AG 1 1 1 3
AI 2 2
AN 2 5 1 2 6 1 2 25 44
AW 1 2 1 2 6
BB 1 1 1 2 5 68 78
BH 1 2 1 2 6 5 17
BM 7 1 3 1 2 1 2 15 128 160
BS 1 1 2 3 1 3 22 33
BZ 1 1
CH 11 3 58 79 11 3 11 57 1 1 17 1 20 56 211 540
CY 3 1 4 1 4 8 2 3 1 7 26 60
DM 1 2 3
GD 1 1
GI 1 1 1 4 16 23
HK 1 3 21 21 4 1 5 31 1 1 2 1 9 69 198 368
IE 1 4 10 13 1 7 5 21 1 28 15 1 11 113 181 412
IS 1 2 2 1 5 11
JO 1 3 2 2 3 5 16
KN 1 1
KY 1 5 1 1 1 5 1 17 117 149
LB 3 1 1 8 6 20
LC 2 2 2 6
LI 1 4 2 1 1 3 4 16
LR 1 1 9 11
LU 1 9 11 19 1 6 3 38 2 1 8 7 47 108 261
MC 1 5 2 2 10
MH 1 4 5
MO 1 1 2 6 10
MT 3 2 8 2 1 1 7 5 29
MU 1 3 4 1 10 3 54 76
PA 7 4 4 5 3 1 6 31 61
SC 1 1 1 3
SG 2 3 27 31 6 1 4 46 1 2 12 6 10 69 276 496
VC 1 1 2
VG 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 19 48 82
VU 4 4
WS 1 1 2
Total 27 25 173 204 29 28 31 248 17 38 84 12 66 468 1,577 3,026
(i) Source: 2007 ORBIS static ownership structure. (ii) Number of subsidiaries.
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Table 6: Descriptive Statistics of the Main Variables
All companies Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Tax bill/total assets .019 .026 -.190 .222
Number of subsidiaries in tax havens 2 6.134 0 192
Dummy - at least one tax haven subsidiary .409 .492 0 1
Dummy - more than two tax haven subsidiaries .261 .439 0 1
Dummy - more than three tax haven subsidiaries .184 .388 0 1
Dummy - more than four tax haven subsidiaries .139 .346 0 1
Dummy - more than 30 tax haven subsidiaries .011 .103 0 1
P&L before tax/total assets (if gain) .070 .070 0 .521
P&L before tax/total assets (if loss) -.056 .227 -6.964 0
Dummy - aggregate loss 0.243 .429 0 1
Intangibles/total assets .203 .190 0 .975
Log(employees) 7.390 2.175 0 14.557
Companies headquartered in territorial countries
Tax bill/total assets .018 .022 -.190 .222
Number of subsidiaries in tax havens 2.5 5.66 0 104
Dummy - at least one tax haven subsidiary .53 .50 0 1
P&L before tax/total assets (if gain) .070 .064 0 .521
P&L before tax/total assets (if loss) -.11 .15 -2.13 0
Dummy - aggregate loss 0.16 .37 0 1
Intangibles/total assets .15 .16 0 .86
Log(employees) 7.5 2.12 1.1 13.1
Companies headquartered in worldwide countries
Tax bill/total assets .02 .027 -.115 .159
Number of subsidiaries in tax havens 1.93 6.28 0 192
Dummy - at least one tax haven subsidiary .37 .48 0 1
P&L before tax/total assets (if gain) .070 .07 0 .48
P&L before tax/total assets (if loss) -.26 .45 -6.97 0
Dummy - aggregate loss 0.27 .44 0 1
Intangibles/total assets .22 .20 0 .97
Log(employees) 7.34 2.19 0 14.6
(i) Intangibles include goodwill (ii) The median number of tax haven subsidiaries is 1 for
territorial jurisdictions and 0 for worldwide jurisdictions. (iii) The total number of ulti-
mate owners is 3,389 and total number of observations is 12,876.
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Table 7: Descriptive Statistics by Type of Group
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
MNCs with Subsidiaries in Tax Havens
Tax bill/total assets 5,407 .022 .025 -.190 .222
Number of total subsidiaries 76 137.29 1 2,288
Number of subs in tax havens 5 8.684 0 192
Dummy - any subs in tax havens .974 .161 0 1
Dummy - less than 2 subs in tax havens .534 .490 0 1
Dummy - more than 2 subs in tax havens .439 .496 0 1
P&L before tax/total assets (if gain) .077 .070 0 .421
P&L before tax/total assets (if loss) -.021 .102 -2.434 0
Dummy - aggregate loss .165 .371 0 1
Intangibles/total assets .207 .174 0 .934
Log(number of employees) 8.406 1.987 0 14.557
MNCs without Subsidiaries in Tax Havens
Tax bill/total assets 5,045 .019 .027 -.113 .159
Number total subsidiaries 23 59.13 1 1,398
P&L before tax/total assets (if gain) .069 .071 0 .521
P&L before tax/total assets (if loss) -.059 .21 -4.252 0
Dummy - aggregate loss .256 .437 0 1
Intangibles/total assets .192 .189 0 .924
Log(number of employees) 6.929 1.905 0 12.806
Domestic Groups
Tax bill/tot. assets 2,424 .013 .027 -.115 .143
Number total subsidiaries 8 17.71 1 249
P&L before tax/total assets (if gain) .053 .066 0 .483
P&L before tax/total assets (if loss) -.128 .338 -6.964 0
Dummy - making a loss .390 .488 0 1
Debt ratio .536 .353 .012 4.935
Intangibles/total assets .213 .224 0 .975
Log(number of employees) 6.023 2.040 0 11.695
(i) GUOs are grouped according to their structure in 2007. (ii) The variable ‘Number of
subsidiaries in tax havens’ and the dummy variables indicating the presence of those sub-
sidiaries are equal to zero for all MNCs without tax haven subsidiaries and for domestic
groups.
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Table 8: ETRs, Losses, and Tax Charges Across Types of Companies
MNCs MNCs Domestic MNCs MNCs Domestic
with TH subs without TH subs groups with TH subs without TH subs groups
ETR - only positive values (per cent) ETR - all observations (per cent)
2003 32 34 34 23 21 18
2004 30 31 33 24 20 17
2005 30 30 32 24 21 17
2006 29 30 33 24 21 17
2007 28 30 31 23 20 17
Mean 30 31 33 23 21 17
Per cent of groups reporting losses Per cent of groups reporting negative tax charges
2003 23 31 40 17 24 40
2004 17 27 37 13 23 38
2005 15 24 38 12 21 36
2006 14 23 39 11 20 37
2007 15 23 39 11 21 34
Mean 17 25 40 12 22 37
Mean gain size (over total assets) Mean loss size (over total assets)
2003 .062 .058 .048 .032 .069 .165
2004 .074 .067 .051 .021 .061 .105
2005 .079 .071 .052 .020 .055 .126
2006 .083 .074 .057 .017 .062 .129
2007 .084 .074 .053 .019 .053 .124
Mean .077 .069 .053 .021 .059 .128
(i) Mean ETR calculated using only observations with both positive pre-tax profit and positive tax charges
(ii) Mean ETR calculated setting to zero observations with either losses or negative tax charge.
(iii) All values are consolidated.
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Table 9: Marginal Effective Tax Rate - METR
Dependent variable: Tax bill/total assets (1) (2) (3) (4)
Lag(tax bill/total assets) 0.079*** 0.090*** 0.082*** 0.089***
(0.019) (0.020) (0.019) (0.020)
P&L/tot.assets (if gain) 16.607*** 17.338*** 16.511*** 17.474***
(4.618) (4.457) (4.615) (4.448)
X dW 19.191*** 16.736***
(5.122) (5.049)
X dUS 18.815*** 16.223***
(5.167) (5.096)
X dUK 12.039** 12.310**
(5.728) (5.968)
X dIE -1.749 -0.852
(11.433) (11.466)
Dummy - aggregate loss 1.549*** 1.091** 1.582*** 1.116**
(0.558) (0.500) (0.558) (0.500)
Intangibles/tot.assets -2.287 -1.463 -2.300 -1.467
(2.664) (2.419) (2.665) (2.416)
X dW 3.177 2.612 2.914 2.452
(2.875) (2.622) (2.857) (2.611)
Log(employees) -1.118*** -1.013*** -1.149*** -1.023***
(0.386) (0.366) (0.387) (0.366)
X dW 1.551*** 1.518*** 1.367*** 1.430***
(0.510) (0.484) (0.499) (0.481)
Country-year dummies X X X X
AR(1) -13.41 -12.20 -13.41 -12.19
p-value [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
AR(2) -0.997 -1.169 -1.195 -1.309
p-value [0.319] [0.242] [0.232] [0.191]
Hansen over-identification test 58.37 65.11 73.78 76.04
Degrees of freedom (54) (54) (66) (66)
p-value [0.318] [0.143] [0.239] [0.187]
Observations 12,876 10,452 12,876 10,452
Number of groups 3,389 2,665 3,389 2,665
(i) Regressions are run on all companies in columns (1) and (3) and only on multinationals in
columns (2) and (4). (ii) Regressions run using a GMM-diff estimator (Arellano and Bond
[1991]). (iii) Standard errors in parentheses. (iv) Instruments used are 2nd and further lags
of firm-level variables and country-year dummies. Instruments are collapsed as described in
Roodman [2009]. (v) ***, **, * significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
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Table 10: Marginal Effective Tax Base - METB
Dependent variable: Tax bill/total assets (1) (2) (3) (4)
Lag(tax bill/total assets) 0.073*** 0.080*** 0.075*** 0.082***
(0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.019)
P&L/tot.assets (if gain) * τH 83.465*** 80.390*** 81.780*** 80.662***
(10.440) (10.368) (10.450) (10.387)
X dW -1.569 -2.813
(11.402) (11.592)
X dUS -8.856 -9.801
(11.684) (11.879)
X dUK 20.751 14.291
(18.743) (20.875)
X dIE 1.064 -13.395
(51.973) (52.274)
Dummy - aggregate loss 1.451*** 1.152** 1.628*** 1.336**
(0.544) (0.534) (0.544) (0.532)
Intangibles/tot.assets 2.414 2.460 1.528 1.886
(2.076) (1.911) (2.051) (1.895)
X dW -2.067 -1.845 -1.727 -1.735
(2.098) (1.931) (2.085) (1.916)
Log(employees) 0.020 -0.031 0.003 -0.004
(0.363) (0.331) (0.361) (0.329)
X dW 0.012 0.162 -0.393 -0.130
(0.457) (0.426) (0.452) (0.425)
Country dummies X X X X
AR(1) -13.53 -12.33 -13.63 -12.48
p-value [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
AR(2) -1.516 -1.538 -1.126 -1.297
p-value [0.130] [0.124] [0.260] [0.195]
Hansen over-identification test 69.96 72.04 86.76 90.00
Degrees of freedom (54) (54) (66) (66)
p-value [0.071] [0.051] [0.044] [0.026]
Observations 12,876 10,452 12,876 10,452
Number of groups 3,389 2,665 3,389 2,665
(i) Regressions are run on all companies in columns (1) and (3) and only on multinationals in
columns (2) and (4). (ii) Regressions run using a GMM-diff estimator (Arellano and Bond
[1991]). (iii) Standard errors in parentheses.
(iv) Instruments used are 2nd and further lags of firm-level variables, the 1st and 2nd lag of
the previous two periods’ average tax bill divided by total assets, and country-year dummies.
Instruments are collapsed as described in Roodman [2009]. (v) ***, **, * significant at 1%,
5% and 10% respectively.
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Table 11: METR and Tax Haven Operations
Dependent variable: Tax bill/total assets (1) (2) (3) (4)
Lag(tax bill/total assets) 0.074*** 0.083*** 0.071*** 0.082***
(0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010)
P&L/tot.assets (if gain) 21.419*** 21.728*** 21.470*** 21.890***
(3.536) (3.427) (3.531) (3.420)
X dW 14.778*** 13.070***
(4.147) (4.095)
X dUS 15.173*** 13.348***
(4.131) (4.078)
X dUK 7.724* 7.482*
(4.194) (4.207)
X dIE -4.607 -2.745
(11.080) (11.339)
X no. subs tax havens (n) -0.711** -0.844*** -0.785*** -0.881***
(0.297) (0.303) (0.294) (0.299)
X no. subs tax havens squared (n2) 0.025*** 0.027*** 0.028*** 0.028***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
X dW X n 0.433 0.672** 0.586* 0.746**
(0.313) (0.321) (0.307) (0.314)
X dW X n2 -0.022*** -0.025*** -0.025*** -0.027***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
n -0.817** -0.381 -1.012*** -0.679*
(0.409) (0.398) (0.375) (0.368)
n2 0.015*** 0.008* 0.015*** 0.010**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
Dummy - aggregate loss 2.378*** 1.832*** 2.360*** 1.805***
(0.562) (0.529) (0.564) (0.528)
X n -0.601*** -0.429** -0.601*** -0.409**
(0.175) (0.167) (0.177) (0.168)
X n2 0.022*** 0.014* 0.022*** 0.013*
(0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007)
Intangibles/tot.assets 0.796 0.678 0.749 0.686
(0.833) (0.843) (0.810) (0.823)
X n -0.358*** -0.346*** -0.380*** -0.378***
(0.078) (0.079) (0.080) (0.079)
X n2 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.006***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Log(employees) -1.259*** -1.233*** -1.302*** -1.271***
(0.310) (0.314) (0.312) (0.312)
X dW 1.373*** 1.567*** 1.370*** 1.570***
(0.403) (0.405) (0.393) (0.396)
X dW X n 0.114*** 0.115*** 0.125*** 0.127***
(0.038) (0.039) (0.038) (0.039)
X dW X n2 -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Country-year dummies X X X X
AR(1) -13.90 -12.59 -13.82 -12.52
p-value [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
AR(2) -0.888 -1.066 -1.183 -1.251
p-value [0.375] [0.286] [0.237] [0.211]
Hansen over-identification test 140.0 147.2 151.2 156.1
Degrees of freedom (146) (146) (158) (158)
p-value [0.624] [0.457] [0.636] [0.527]
Observations 12,876 10,452 12,876 10,452
Number of groups 3,389 2,665 3,389 2,665
(i) Regressions are run on all companies in columns (1) and (3) and only on multinationals in
columns (2) and (4). (ii) Regressions run using a GMM-diff estimator (Arellano and Bond
[1991]). (iii) Standard errors in parentheses. (iv) Instruments used are 2nd and further lags
of firm-level variables and country-year dummies. Instruments are collapsed as described in
Roodman [2009]. (v) ***, **, * significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
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Table 12: METB and Tax Haven Operations
Dependent variable: Tax bill/total assets (1) (2) (3) (4)
Lag(tax bill/total assets) 0.073*** 0.083*** 0.076*** 0.082***
(0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010)
P&L/tot.assets (if gain)*τH 84.023*** 83.255*** 83.539*** 83.897***
(9.084) (8.995) (9.115) (8.985)
X dW -2.720 -6.405
(10.437) (10.517)
X dUS -7.511 -11.315
(10.497) (10.442)
X dUK 7.071 -3.137
(10.741) (10.947)
X dIE 10.960 -4.004
(50.084) (53.262)
X no. subs tax havens (n) -2.384*** -3.154*** -2.341*** -3.149***
(0.834) (0.891) (0.829) (0.886)
X no. subs tax havens squared (n2) 0.080*** 0.090*** 0.079*** 0.090***
(0.012) (0.014) (0.012) (0.014)
X dW X n 2.144** 3.097*** 1.990** 3.025***
(0.889) (0.944) (0.881) (0.939)
X dW X n2 -0.076*** -0.088*** -0.072*** -0.086***
(0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014)
n -0.777** -0.599* -1.054*** -0.863**
(0.386) (0.359) (0.380) (0.352)
n2 0.014*** 0.009** 0.020*** 0.014***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Making loss dummy 2.088*** 1.705*** 2.216*** 1.829***
(0.565) (0.552) (0.568) (0.554)
X n -0.561*** -0.396** -0.560*** -0.388**
(0.170) (0.167) (0.166) (0.166)
X n2 0.020*** 0.012* 0.020*** 0.012
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Intangibles/tot.assets 1.040 1.217 0.606 0.865
(0.815) (0.816) (0.788) (0.792)
X n -0.326*** -0.376*** -0.329*** -0.393***
(0.068) (0.066) (0.068) (0.067)
X n2 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.006***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Log(employees) -0.348 -0.520** -0.358 -0.516**
(0.257) (0.250) (0.256) (0.252)
X dW 0.057 0.367 -0.215 0.174
(0.317) (0.317) (0.312) (0.315)
X n 0.097*** 0.107*** 0.107*** 0.119***
(0.037) (0.037) (0.036) (0.037)
X n2 -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.003***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Country dummies X X X X
AR(1) -13.88 -12.66 -14.07 -12.80
p-value [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
AR(2) -1.352 -1.303 -1.098 -1.194
p-value [0.176] [0.192] [0.272] [0.232]
Hansen over-identification test 153.2 156.2 174.7 177.1
Degrees of freedom (146) (146) (158) (158)
p-value [0.326] [0.267] [0.172] [0.142]
Observations 12,876 10,452 12,876 10,452
Number of groups 3,389 2,665 3,389 2,665
(i) Regressions are run on all companies in columns (1) and (3) and only on multinationals in
columns (2) and (4). (ii) Regressions run using a GMM-diff estimator (Arellano and Bond
[1991]). (iii) Standard errors in parentheses.
(iv) Instruments used are 2nd and further lags of firm-level variables, the 1st and 2nd lag of
the previous two periods’ average tax bill divided by total assets, and country-year dummies.
Instruments are collapsed as described in Roodman [2009]. (v) ***, **, * significant at 1%,
5% and 10% respectively.
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Table 13: Construction of ‘Number of Tax Havens Subsidiaries’ –Example
Year Static ownership structure ZEPHYR ZEPHYR No. subsidiaries
from ORBIS (vendors) (acquirers) in tax havens
BB BM CH HK IE KY LC LU MO PA VC BH HK SG CH MC
1999 1 2 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 18
2000 1 2 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 17
2001 1 2 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 15
2002 1 2 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 15
2003 1 2 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 14
2004 1 2 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 15
2005 1 2 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 15
2006 1 2 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 15
2007 1 2 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 14
(i) Barbados (BB), Bermuda (BM), Switzerland (CH), Hong Kong (HK), Ireland (IE), Cayman Islands (KY),
Saint Lucia (LC), Luxembourg (LU), Macau (MO), Panama (PA), Saint Vincent (VC), Singapore (SG),
Monaco (MC). (ii) Figures represent the number of subsidiaries located in each tax haven. In the section
‘ZEPHYR (vendors)’ the figures represent the number of subsidiaries sold by the ultimate owner in that spe-
cific year. In the section ‘ZEPHYR (acquirers)’ the figures represent the number of subsidiaries acquired by
the ultimate owner in that specific year. (iii) The value of the variable recording the number of subsidiaries
located in tax havens for 2007 is created by adding up the static information from ORBIS (column 2 to
12). The value of such a variable for the previous year (2006) is created by adding up the information from
ZEPHYR vendors (column 13 to 16, row 2007) and by subtracting the information from ZEPHYR acquirers
(column 17, row 2007). The process continues backwards until the last year (here 1999).
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Table 14: Construction of the Dataset used in the Empirical Analysis
No. of companies No. observations
ORBIS (online version 16/10/2008)
Selecting on large and very large companies 1,093,428
Exclude companies with no financial information 739,989
Region: Western Europe (26), Canada, and the United States 427,331
Industrial companies only 401,944
Number of employees available non missing 293,906
Only Global Ultimate Owners 26,193
Active companies only 25,201
Firms with consolidated accounts only 17,876
Total assets available for last year 17,863
Companies with majority owned subsidiaries(i) 17,816
Actual download from online version(ii) 15,207 136,863
Drop if accounting period different from 12 months 15,207 134,360
Drop if total assets negative or zero 15,207 134,257
Drop non-suitable sectors 14,592 128,833
Drop countries with less than 300 observations 14,555 128,503
Drop if incorporation year is missing 13,918 122,842
Drop outliers(iii) 13,710 117,495
Drop if total assets, P&L before tax, or tax bill missing 13,089 76,445
Drop if information on ownership structure missing 12,959 75,930
MERGE WITH ZEPHYR ACQUIRERS 12,959 75,930
- of which present in ZEPHYR (acquirers) 295 348
MERGE WITH ZEPHYR VENDORS 12,959 75,930
- of which present in ZEPHYR (vendors) 190 271
- of which present in ZEPHYR (acquirers and (or) vendors) 437 606
Drop if number of subs in tax havens is negative 12,908 75,532
- of which present in ZEPHYR (acquirers and (or) vendors) also 386 541
Drop if number of employees missing 5,161 35,288
Drop if (intangibles/total assets) missing 4,618 28,882
Drop if (debt/total assets) missing 4,618 28,882
- of which present in ZEPHYR (acquirers and (or) vendors) also 335 471
Drop if observations not contiguous in the time for same company 4,618 27,120
- of which present in ZEPHYR (acquirers and (or) vendors) also 323 452
(i) Subsidiaries are of the following type: industrial, insurance, banks, or financial institutions.
(ii) The number of companies obtainable through the actual download is slightly smaller than the number
of companies potentially available from the online version of ORBIS. This happens because some obser-
vations are dropped during the download as they miss all the variables, including the company name and
identification number. (iii) Outliers are defined as the observations with a value of P&L before taxation
total assets
,
Tax bill
P&L before taxation
, Fixed assets
no. employees
, or age within the top or bottom 1 per cent. The observations dropped
are 4.35 per cent of the sample.
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Table 15: Download of ZEPHYR
ZEPHYR ACQUIRERS (online version 06/01/2009) No. firms No. obs No. deals
(acquirers)
Acquirer located in OECD country 379,323
Target located in tax haven 11,348
Deal type: merger or acquisition 6,634
Deal completed from 1999 onwards 4,295
Actual downloadi 3,963 4,762 4,256
Drop if acquirer’s ID missing 2,405 3,204 3,142
Drop if country of target missing 2,362 3,143 3,138
Keep if final stake is majority 1,792 2,248 2,244
Drop if year of deal 2008 or missing 1,579 1,957 1,957
Drop if acquirer’s country not relevant 1,523 1,886 1,957
Drop if country of target not tax haven 1,491 1,841 1,886
Create a panel with only one observation for each year and each company 1,491 1,701
ZEPHYR VENDORS (online version 06/01/2009) No. firms No. obs No. deals
(vendors)
Vendor located in OECD country 140,425
Target located in tax haven 5,166
Deal completed from 1999 onwards 3,252
Actual downloadi 3,224 4,097 3,223
Drop if aquirer’s ID missing 1,528 2,401 2,086
Drop if country of target missing 1,392 2,189 2,084
Drop if year of deal 2008 or missing 1,257 1,822 1,822
Drop if country of target not tax haven 1,220 1,773 1,773
Create a panel with only one observation for each year and each company 1,220 1,528
(i) The number of deals obtainable through the actual download is slightly smaller than the number of deals po-
tentially available from the online version of ZEPHYR. This happens because some observations are dropped
during the download as they miss all the variables, including the company name and identification number.
54
Table 16: Corporate Groups by Sector
Sector No. of corporate groups Per cent
Mining and quarrying 110 3.25
Manufacturing of food products and beverages 92 2.71
Manufacturing of tobacco products 5 0.15
Manufacturing of textiles 22 0.65
Manufacturing of wearing apparel 28 0.83
Manufacturing of leather products 11 0.32
Manufacturing of wood 10 0.30
Manufacturing of paper 36 1.06
Publishing and printing 54 1.59
Manufacturing of coke, petroleum, and nuclear fuel 14 0.41
Manufacturing of chemicals 220 6.49
Manufacturing of rubber and plastic products 46 1.36
Manufacturing of other non-metallic products 31 0.91
Manufacturing of basic metals 51 1.50
Manufacturing of fabricated metal prods 46 1.36
v machinery and equipment 172 5.08
Manufacturing of office machinery and computers 65 1.92
Manufacturing of electrical machinery 61 1.80
Manufacturing of radio, TVs, and communication equipment 280 8.26
Manufacturing of medical, precision, and optical instruments 192 5.67
Manufacturing of transport equipment 99 2.92
Manufacturing of various 68 2.01
Electricity, gas and water supply 83 2.45
Construction 76 2.24
Wholesale and retail trade 307 9.06
Hotels and restaurants 73 2.15
Transport 97 2.86
Post and telecommunication 130 3.84
Financial intermediation 102 3.01
Real estate activities 43 1.27
Renting of machinery and equipment 22 0.65
Computer and related activities 348 10.27
Research and development 35 1.03
Other business activities 244 7.20
Recreational, cultural, and sport activities 116 3.42
Total 3,389 100.00
(i) Sectors correspond to the two-digit NACE codes (Rev. 1.1).
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Table 17: Comparing Different Estimators
Dependent variable: Tax bill/total assets (1) (2) (3)
Lag(tax bill/total assets) 0.283*** -0.023 0.079***
(0.015) (0.014) (0.019)
P&L/total assets (if gain) 20.856*** 20.179*** 16.607***
(0.877) (1.510) (4.618)
X dW 2.785*** 3.883** 19.191***
(0.955) (1.901) (5.122)
Dummy - aggregate loss 0.196* 0.216 1.549***
(0.105) (0.145) (0.558)
Intangibles/tot.assets 0.002 -0.921 -2.287
(0.204) (0.634) (2.664)
X dW 0.133 1.312* 3.177
(0.219) (0.681) (2.875)
Log(employees) 0.057*** -0.029 -1.118***
(0.013) (0.109) (0.386)
X dW -0.008 0.141 1.551***
(0.016) (0.129) (0.510)
Country-year dummies X X X
AR(1) . . -13.41
p-value . . [0.000]
AR(2) . . -0.997
p-value . . [0.319]
Hansen over-identification test . . 58.37
Degrees of freedom . . (54)
p-value . . [0.318]
Observations 12,876 12,876 12,876
Number of groups 3,389 3,389 3,389
(i) Regressions run using a pooled OLS (column 1), a within-group estimator (col-
umn 2) and a GMM-diff estimator (Arellano and Bond [1991]) in column 3.
(ii) Standard errors in parentheses and clustered at group level.
(iii) Instruments used are 2nd and further lags of firm-level variables and country-
year dummies. Instruments are collapsed as described in Roodman [2009].
(iv) ***, **, * significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
Table 18: Within-group Changes in Tax Haven Dummies
No. of groups Per cent of total corporate groups
Dummy - at least one tax haven subsidiary 47 1.3
Dummy - two or more tax haven subsidiaries 37 1.1
Dummy - three or more tax haven subsidiaries 29 0.9
Dummy - four or more tax haven subsidiaries 19 0.6
Dummy - more than 30 tax haven subsidiaries 10 0.3
Total 3,389
(i) Number of corporate groups recording at least one change in the dummy.
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